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This paper explores the relationship between language, subjectivity and 
teaching in Emmanuel Levinas’s Totality and Infinity.  It aims to elucidate 
Levinas’s presentation of language as always already predicated on a 
relationship of responsibility towards that which is beyond the self and the 
idea that it is only in this condition of being responsible that we are subjects.  
Levinas suggests that the relation with the Other through which I am a subject 
as one uniquely responsible is also the scene of teaching.  Through examining 
these ethical conditions of subjectivity, I suggest that this notion of the self as 
oriented towards the Other in a relation of passivity presents a challenge to 
many of the standard topoi of teaching and learning and invite us to consider 





My being is produced in producing itself before the others in discourse; it is 
what it reveals of itself to the others, but while participating in, attending its 
revelation (Levinas, [1969] 2004, p. 253; hereafter TI). 
 
If this statement is a true presentation of how I am, what does it mean for our 
understanding of education? That discourse is fundamental to the trajectory of the 
individual’s ‘becoming’, and that this is in some sense what education is appears 
uncontroversial. Dewey, for example, writes: ‘all communication (and hence all 
genuine social life) is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an 
enlarged and changed experience’ (Dewey, [1916] 1930, p. 6). Martin Buber also 
suggests such an idea, stating: ‘The relation in education is one of pure dialogue’ 
(Buber, [1947] 2002, p. 116). In this paper, I explore how Emmanuel Levinas presents 
discourse as teaching, examining how subjectivity is produced through the revealing 
of myself to others in discourse. The focus of this paper is Totality and Infinity, the 
first of Levinas’s two most central philosophical works1, because it is here that we 
find Levinas’s clearest and most distinctive discussion of the nature of teaching. To 
say that the discussion is ‘clear’ is misleading, however. The language of Totality and 
Infinity, both in English and in the original French, is strange, enigmatic, attempting 
to draw attention to the impossibility of capturing the relation with the Other2 in 
language. As Colin Davis writes: 
 
Levinas’s acute awareness of the pitfalls involved in overcoming 
ontology, in becoming Abraham boldly stepping out into the unknown 
rather than Ulysses seeking only what he had left behind, helps to explain 
the extraordinary difficulty of his writing. His texts are assertive and 
propositional, but also enigmatic, fragmented, paradoxical or perhaps just 
plain inconsistent (Davis, [1996] 2004, p. 35). 
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However, despite the difficulty of reading and writing about Levinas, the challenge he 
presents to preconceptions of the nature of language and knowledge have significant 
implications for how we think about education. I will here, therefore, attempt to 
delineate how Levinas presents teaching as the other’s offering of the world to me 
through speech, in contrast with more maieutic understandings of teaching. I will 
thereby demonstrate how Levinas’s philosophy presents a unique challenge to other 
conceptions of the function of language. For Levinas, teaching is the space of 
encounter in which subjectivity is revealed as ethical, constituted through both Desire 
and goodness, both of which are encountered in language.3 Through examining how 
this is presented in Totality and Infinity, I will consider what is unique in Levinas’s 
presentation of subjectivity, and how this encourages us to reconsider what ‘teaching’ 
means.  
 
DISCOURSE AS TEACHING IN TOTALITY AND INFINITY  
 
Before examining Levinas’s presentation of language in Totality and Infinity, it is 
necessary to address briefly the question of Levinas’s philosophical methodology. 
The somewhat oedipal relationship between Levinas’s phenomenology and that of 
Husserl and Heidegger is well documented. Levinas describes his writing as ‘in the 
spirit of Husserlian philosophy’ (Levinas, [1981] 2004, p. 183), and in the preface of 
Totality and Infinity he states: 
 
But the development of the notions employed owe everything to the 
phenomenological method. Intentional analysis is the search for the 
concrete. Notions held under the direct gaze of the thought that defines 
them are nevertheless, unbeknown to this naïve thought, revealed to be 
implanted in horizons unsuspected by this thought; these horizons endow 
them with a meaning—such is the essential teaching of Husserl (TI, p. 
98). 
 
Nevertheless, although the account of ethical subjectivity and the relation to the 
Other is presented in terms of transcendental phenomenology, scholars have 
suggested different ways of reading Levinas. Robert Bernasconi, for example, 
has suggested that it is possible to read Levinas both transcendentally and 
empirically, but that neither reading is sufficient (Bernasconi, 1989). Levinas 
describes his own philosophy, in his 1965 essay ‘Énigme et phénomène’ as a 
philosophy of darkness (darkness being an allusion to the idea of light in 
phenomenology), and this is the most useful description of his ‘method’. While 
adopting the Husserlian phenomenological method in Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas at the same time departs from Husserlian intentional analysis by 
drawing attention to what lies beyond the phenomenon, opaque to 
consciousness itself. Levinas is operating outside of either descriptive or 
normative ethics, and his statement that ‘ethics is not an optics’ (TI, p. 23) also 
indicates the disturbance of the field of consciousness and bringing to light 
associated with phenomenology. It points to an ethical phenomenology that 
demonstrates an obsession with the ethical beyond and yet revealed by the 
phenomenon. This, then, is the philosophical ‘framework’ within which I 
propose to analyse Levinas’s presentation of language and the scene of teaching 
in Totality and Infinity.  
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In Totality and Infinity, the linguistic order is the site of totality and the site of 
infinity, or ethics. Levinas states that ‘the essence of language is goodness . . . the 
essence of language is friendship and hospitality’ (TI, p. 205). The use of language, 
however, may be totalising, attempting to bring the Other within the totality of the 
Same: ‘Thematization and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not 
peace with the other but suppression or possession of the other’ (p. 46). In Totality 
and Infinity, Levinas seeks to show that the essence of language is interpellation, the 
Other’s address to me, through which I as a subject am situated.  
For Levinas, language presupposes a relation to the Other, which remains 
transcendent to the same, and one of the aims of Totality and Infinity is to demonstrate 
that the relation with alterity is language itself: 
 
We shall try to show that the relation between the same and the other—upon 
which we seem to impose such extraordinary conditions—is language. For 
language accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limited within 
this relation, such that the other, despite the relationship with the same, 
remains transcendent to the same. The relation between the same and the 
other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as conversation. . . (Levinas, 
[1969] 2004, p. 39). 
 
‘Conversation’ and ‘discourse’ are used by Levinas synonymously to describe the 
relation between self and Other, which maintains a separation between the two terms.  
Through the approach of the Other, my spontaneity is limited: ‘The strangeness of the 
Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely 
accomplished as a calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics’ (TI, p. 43).  
This other has been suppressed, Levinas argues, by the history of Western 
philosophy, as exemplified by the teaching of Socrates as maieutics.4 This, Levinas 
suggests, means: ‘to receive nothing of the Other but what is in me’ (ibid.). We can 
see this in the Theaetetus, in which Socrates claims that he is a midwife (Theaetetus, 
184b), who delivers thoughts through his maieutic art, the method of delivery being 
the elenchos. The Socratic dialogue is not an insemination, for Socrates presents 
himself as a barren midwife in the process of his student’s coming to understanding, 
insisting: ‘You ask me if I teach you when I say there is no teaching but recollection’ 
(Meno, 82). For Socrates, knowledge and understanding are not imparted from 
without, but are seen as ‘in’ the soul of the individual.5 
Levinas is radically opposed to this notion of teaching, suggesting instead that to 
be taught means to encounter that which is wholly other, which ‘brings me more than 
I contain’: 
 
To approach the Other in conversation is to welcome his expression, in 
which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from 
it. It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the Capacity of the I, 
which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be 
taught. The relation with the Other, or conversation, is a non-allergic 
relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed this conversation is a teaching 
[enseignement]. Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the 
exterior and brings me more than I contain.[6] In its non-violent transitivity 
the very epiphany of the face is produced[7] (TI, p. 51). 
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For Levinas, I am taught what I could not have discovered within myself. In the 
approach of the Other, meaning and truth are produced from beyond myself, and a 
common world is created between self and Other: ‘To speak is to make the world 
common, to create commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality of 
concepts, but lays the foundation for a possession in common’ (TI, p. 76). Speech 
itself is therefore a teaching in its founding of the world and community: 
 
As an attendance of being at its own presence, speech is a teaching. Teaching 
does not simply transmit an abstract and general content already common to 
me and the Other. It does not merely assume an after all subsidiary function 
of being midwife to a mind already pregnant with its fruit. Speech first 
founds community by giving, by presenting the phenomenon as given; and it 
gives by thematizing (TI, p. 98). 
 
The etymology of ‘thematizing’, from tithēmi, implies placing / setting, here 
placing what is offered in speech before me, giving me the phenomenon, or to use 
Levinas’s phrase, ‘presenting the phenomenon as given’. ‘Given’ here has the 
force of ‘gift’ rather than a flat geometric ‘given.’ This should not be taken as in 
any way foundational in a developmental sense, as the development of 
consciousness; it is rather a description of the conditions of consciousness and 
subjectivity. However, thinking about how the child might develop language can 
help us to think further about what this notion of the phenomenon as a gift means. 
Let us imagine, for example, a small child being given a bowlful of raspberries 
by her mother. The child’s consciousness of the bowl of fruit and its meaning are 
invested through the actions and address of her mother who looks for the child’s 
response to her action. Thus it is the mother who ‘gives’ the child ‘raspberries’, 
in the sense that the fruit is thematised, set in place in the world for the child by 
the mother, given a meaning and a context. What is significant is not the idea that 
the child learns the word ‘raspberry’, or the concept ‘raspberry’ through the 
mother’s actions, but rather that through the ‘giving’, through the mother’s 
actions that address the child and look for her response, the phenomenon of 
raspberries comes to the child. The child may be only at an early stage in the 
development of language at this stage, but as the mother is vulnerable to the way 
in which the child reacts to her offering, the child’s subjectivity is already being 
produced, prior to its being known by the child. We can easily see why this kind 
of interaction might be termed ‘teaching’, and why it is opposed to Socratic 
maieutics, since the phenomenon comes to the child from beyond herself, and it 
is this offering of phenomena to me and my receiving them that is for Levinas the 
condition of subjectivity.  
In this scene of teaching, the teacher remains outside of my knowing. ‘The 
master, the coinciding of the teaching and the teacher, is not in turn a fact among 
others. The presence of the manifestation of the master who teaches overcomes 
the anarchy of facts’ (TI, p. 70). For Levinas this is prior to objectivity, which 
arises as the result of putting things in question between self and Other, the 
offering of the world. This is also therefore prior to reason, so that difference and 
separation must be seen as necessary conditions for reason, rather than reason 
overcoming difference. The transcendental condition for language then is a 
relation with what is beyond language. Levinas appears opposed to the view of 
language as primarily communication, as in common usage8 and in some 
contemporary conceptions of English teaching:  
 5 
 
The ‘communication’ of ideas, the reciprocity of language, already hides the 
profound essence of language. It resides in the irreversibility of the relation 
between me and the other, in the Mastery of the Master coinciding with his 
position as other and as exterior. For language can be spoken only if the 
interlocutor is the commencement of his discourse, if, consequently, he 
remains beyond the system, if he is not on the same plane as myself (TI, p. 
101). 
 
This should not be understood as a kind of authoritarianism; it tries rather to convey 
the idea that language comes from outside myself, from an alterity that is rooted in the 
vulnerability of other persons and is refractory to my intentionality. The idea here that 
the relation between I and Other is not reciprocal is fundamental, since if I posit the 
Other as another I, for example, I minimise their alterity and presume to know them 
as one like me.9 The speaking of language depends on its commencement by one who 
is outside language, for whom I have responsibility, and thus he is, in this sense my 
Master, as he calls me to responsibility from his position of vulnerability. This alterity 
that is situated at the commencement of my discourse lies beyond my understanding 
and cannot be communicated. In relation to teaching, Levinas’s emphasis that 
language is the site of my ethical subjectivity, and that to receive language is to be 
taught, is very different from the common emphasis on the communicative function of 
language in teaching. For Levinas, if we are to talk about communication at all, what 
is communicated must be seen as inextricably bound up with what lies beyond 
communication. 
As well as opposing the view that language is communication, Levinas might 
also be critical of other conceptions of language for likewise clouding the ethical 
conditions of language in other ways, for example structuralist interpretations. 
Levinas takes many ideas from structuralist linguistics but diverges at significant 
points. A significant idea within structuralism was its challenge to the modernist 
emphasis on human autonomy, with, as John Llewelyn describes, its emphasis that 
‘there is only one unit, the system as a whole’. In the human sciences, the ‘the idea 
that “it” (es, ça) thinks in me’ turned into the idea of ‘the death of man’ (Llewelyn, 
2002, p. 120-1). The relationship between language and autonomy for Levinas is 
distinct from the Saussurian model in which the free human is subsumed within the 
system of language. Conversely, it is also distinct from the emphasis on autonomy in 
our use of language that we find in such thinkers as Locke, with his nomenclaturist 
philosophy of language. In his 1957 essay ‘Philosophy and the Idea of Infinity’, 
Levinas phrases this in terms of a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. 
Autonomy is ‘the philosophy which aims to ensure the freedom, or the identity, of 
beings’ and this ‘presupposes that freedom itself is sure of its right, is justified 
without recourse to anything further, is complacent in itself, like Narcissus’ (Levinas, 
1998, p. 49). Heteronomy is ‘concerned with the absolutely other’ (p. 47). For 
Levinas, the relation with the Other is prior to all experience and cognition, therefore I 
cannot have autonomy in the Lockean sense of a freedom of voluntary attribution of 
words to ideas in mental privacy. Yet neither am I subsumed by the system of 
language as I am in the structuralist opposition to autonomy. Levinas’s view that we 
are heteronomous subjects implies a singularity of the I, since although language and 
understanding are brought to me by the Other who is beyond the I, my responses to 
the Other are an integral aspect of the appearance of my world within my horizons. 
There is thus a confirmation of the self as unique in the way it alone can respond to 
 6 
the appeal of the Other’s address, but this is neither the autonomy of the Lockean 
subject, nor its antithesis in structuralism. 
Levinas’s use of the words signifiant and signifié stems from structuralism, 
however, as Llewelyn points out, the term signifiant no longer refers to the phonetic 
or graphic signifier, but to the speaker of the sign.10 The signifier is the Other, not 
signified by the sign.11 In speaking, the speaker is revealed as Other while the world 
appears to the self: ‘The Other, the signifer, manifests himself in speech by speaking 
of the world and not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing the world, by 
thematizing it.’ (TI, p. 96). In this way, meaning depends on the interpellation of the 
Other who signifies, who calls me to responsibility. The address of the Other, for 
Levinas, is the absolute upon which all meaning depends and the site of meaning is 
also the site of teaching, for to receive a meaning is to be taught: ‘To have meaning is 
to be situated relative to an absolute, that is, to come from that alterity that is not 
absorbed in its being perceived. . . To have meaning is to teach or to be taught, to 
speak or to be able to be stated’ (p. 97). A further parallel between Levinas and 
structuralism is that like the structuralists, Levinas also views all thought and our very 
notion of reality as always already structured by language. Thus: ‘Everything remains 
in a language or in a world, for the structure of the world resembles the order of 
language, with possibilities no dictionary can arrest’ (Levinas, 1996, p. 38).  
Although language is presented as profoundly ethical by Levinas in a way absent 
from its presentation in structuralism, Levinas emphasises that we do not always 
relate to the Other in discourse: what he calls rhetoric is presented as a corruption of 
discourse. What we most often approach in conversation is not the Other, ‘but an 
object or an infant, or a man of the multitude’ (TI, p. 70). Rhetoric stills the approach 
of the Other, but it is a corruption of discourse, for example as ‘propaganda, flattery, 
diplomacy’ (ibid.), and is a violence in its corruption of freedom, even though it is 
still founded on the approach to the Other, albeit obliquely. The tendency of rhetoric 
is totalising, whereas discourse as teaching is a manifestation of infinity and the 
infinity of responsibility. In conversation, I am summoned to a position of infinite 
responsibility, and this is what ‘Good’ means for Levinas—a site of ethical possibility 
and responsibility, ever deepening. This notion of infinite responsibility does not 
imply that we are always aware of such responsibility, but this is nevertheless the 
reality of what it means to be a subject: 
 
The infinity of responsibility denotes not its actual immensity, but a 
responsibility increasing in the measure that it is assumed; duties become 
greater in the measure that they are accomplished. The better I accomplish 
my duty the fewer rights I have; the more I am just the more guilty I am (TI, 
p. 244).  
 
This responsibility is asymmetrical: ‘what I permit myself to demand of myself is not 
comparable with what I have the right to demand of the Other. This moral experience, 
so commonplace, indicates a metaphysical asymmetry’ (TI, p. 53). I cannot demand 
responsibility from the other, and I cannot appeal to the neutral third term to demand 
that the Other take responsibility for me. Peace is my responsibility alone: ‘Peace 
must be my peace, in a relation that starts from an I and goes to the other, in desire 
and Goodness, where the I both maintains itself and exists without egoism’ (p. 306). 
This does not mean that the other will not take responsibility for me, but rather that 
when this does happen, this is an experience of grace.  
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As we have seen, the opening of language in Totality and Infinity is the 
Other’s address to me. Language and objectivity are made possible by the Other’s 
teaching, which manifests infinity, bringing me more than I contain. The 
interpellation of the Other and my response mark the beginning of commonality and 
community. Thus Levinas’s philosophy demonstrates the primacy of the ethical 
preconditions of language before its communicative function. What does this mean, 
however, for our understanding of what it is to be a subject?  
 
SUBJECTIVITY AS ETHICAL 
 
It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself. This does not 
mean that my existence is constituted in the thought of the others. . . The face 
I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another sense: in 
discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency 
of the response—acuteness of the present—engenders me for responsibility; 
as responsible I am brought to my final reality (TI, p. 178). 
 
In this passage, we can see clearly articulated the idea that my subjectivity, my final 
reality, is only brought to being as one responsible for the Other. I am thus, and 
contrary to Heidegger, not fundamentally a being-towards-death so much as I am a 
being-towards-the-other, or rather a being-for-the-Other. Being oneself in this way 
means to express oneself, which is already to serve the Other in a relation of 
obligation. I cannot escape the call singularly placed upon me: 
 
The I is a privilege and an election. The sole possibility in being of going 
beyond the straight line of the law, that is, of finding a place lying beyond 
the universal, is to be I. . . The call to infinite responsibility confirms the 
subjectivity in its apologetic position. . . To utter ‘I,’ to affirm the irreducible 
singularity in which the apology is pursued, means to possess a privileged 
place with regard to responsibilities for which no one can replace me and 
from which no one can release me (TI, p. 245). 
 
Subjectivity is thus constituted in receptivity and passivity: it is in turning towards the 
Other that I am. This means both calling into question my spontaneity12, which was 
and is always an illusion, and realising that the world is common between I and Other. 
Subjectivity is Desire for the absolutely Other, and it is Goodness as hospitality 
towards the Other. Levinas’s writing on the phenomenology of eros in Totality and 
Infinity suggests a view of subjectivity in which the encounter between the self and 
the Other is an encounter in which the desire for the Other is always beyond satiation. 
This is beautifully captured in Levinas’s description of the caress: 
 
The caress, like contact, is sensibility. But the caress transcends the 
sensible… The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what 
ceaselessly escapes its form toward a future never future enough, in 
soliciting what slips away as though it were not yet. It searches, it forages. 
It is not an intentionality of disclosure but of search: a movement unto the 
invisible (TI, p. 258). 
 
This image of the caress can be distinguished from the embrace, which would 
imply reciprocity. The caress, in its searching and soliciting what slips away, 
 8 
suggests the nature of subjectivity as opening out onto the true ethical realm of 
discontinuity, disdaining possession and becoming a form of moral contact only 
when it passes beyond contact. Thus to be taught in the encounter with the 
Other whom I desire is a perpetual movement of search, never satisfied and 
beyond the order of labour and economic exchange. 
This relationship of Desire between the I and Other should not be seen, 
however, as a party of two. The relation with the Other means entering into a 
relation with others, the third parties who are also brought to me in the Other: 
‘Language as the presence of the face does not invite complicity with the 
preferred being, the self-sufficient ‘I-Thou’ forgetful of the universe; in its 
frankness it refuses the clandestinity of love, where it loses its frankness and 
meaning and turns into laughter or cooing’ (TI, p. 213). Levinas’s target here, 
with his use of the phrase ‘I-Thou’, may be Buber’s presentation of the relation 
between self and Other, a relation of intimacy and reciprocity, in which all my 
awareness is drawn towards the living reality of a specific other person.  The 
language of ‘laughter’ and ‘cooing’ suggests that Levinas rejects the 
sentimentality of such a relationship, or of what the popularisation of such an 
idea quickly becomes. Levinas’s conception is far from self-sufficient and 
clandestine.  Through the Other I am also drawn into a relation with others, so 
that there never exists a self-sufficient I-Thou: ‘The third party looks at me in the 
eyes of the Other—language is justice’ (TI, p. 213).  
The relationship to the Other is fundamental, but what the Other means is 
always conditioned by the others. To be a subject means to be subject to the 
Other, which is always is to be subject to the others, a subjection I cannot escape. 
This is one of the most distinctive and challenging features of Levinas’s 
presentation of subjectivity: to be a subject means that my spontaneity is always 
already limited through my responsibility to the Other, and I am ‘elected’ to my 
unique subjectivity through the unique way in which I am addressed and made 
responsible by the Other. Thus, ‘[t]he uniqueness of the I is the fact that no one 
can answer for me’ (Levinas, 1996, p. 55). My singularity is confirmed as 
irreducible: only in my singularity can I answer to the address of the Other. 
The way in which subjectivity is discovered is not within the self, but rather 
through expressing and revealing itself to others in discourse: 
 
To produce oneself as I—is to apprehend oneself with the same gesture that 
already turns toward the exterior to extra-vert and to manifest—to respond 
for what it apprehends—to express; it is to affirm that the becoming-
conscious is already language, that the essence of language is goodness, or 
again, that the essence of language is friendship and hospitality (TI, p. 205). 
 
The passivity of the self in receptivity here suggests that the event of subjectivity 
could be taken as a gift: I do not solicit the Other’s approach, which is prior to 
language and offers me the world. The responsibility to the Other takes place without 
my choice: I am always already and uniquely obligated. This uniqueness of my 
responsibility is termed ‘election’ by Levinas, and this obligation deepens as I begin 
to recognise the infinite demand of my responsibility. The relation between my 
unique election, subjectivity and infinite responsibility is elucidated by Levinas in his 
later text Of God Who Comes to Mind: 
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This is the subject, irreplaceable for the responsibility there assigned to him, 
and who therein discovers a new identity. But insofar as it tears me from the 
concept of the Ego [Moi], the fission of the subject is a growth of obligation 
in proportion to my obedience to it; it is the augmentation of culpability with 
the augmentation of holiness, an increase of distance in proportion to my 
approach (Levinas, [1986] 1998, p. 73). 
 
This view is radically different from most conceptions of responsibility in moral 
philosophy. To love and assume responsibility for the Other because he is Other 
rather than one like me is what it means to be a subject, rather than to be responsible 
for the Other because they are one like me, or because we are implicated in reciprocal 
bonds of responsibility.13 And to assume responsibility through the approach of the 
Other is to be taught.  
What then does this view of the condition of subjectivity as the turning 
outwards towards the Other, always already obligated to them in a relation of infinite 
responsibility, mean for how we understand education? 
 
ELECTION TO SUBJECTIVITY – A TEACHING  
 
As subjectivity is infinite responsibility, and as responsibility always ‘increases in the 
measure that it is assumed’, I am, therefore, both already a subject and at the same 
time not yet a subject. But this movement of subjectivity is not a development or 
progression in any linear or developmental sense. Nevertheless, we could say that my 
election to ethical subjectivity is a teaching, the Other ‘bringing me more than I 
contain’. Having come back to the title phrase, let us turn to consider some ways in 
which this notion of ethical subjectivity as a teaching relates to different ways in 
which education has been theorised. There is not scope within this paper to explore 
fully the significant challenges that Levinas presents to educational theory. Therefore, 
I will draw attention to only a few themes, each of which could be considered further 
than I do here. These themes are: the Ulysses / Abraham comparison, Bildung as an 
educational ideal, Martin’s Buber’s dialogical educational philosophy and Michael 
Oakeshott’s presentation of education as ‘the conversation of mankind’. 
 
Ulysses and Abraham 
 
A motif that resonates throughout Levinas’s writing14 is the Ulysses / Abraham 
comparison. Against Ulysses, who after his wanderings returns to Ithaca, Levinas 
prefers Abraham, who departs from his homeland never to return, in search of an 
unknown land. Levinas describes the history of Western philosophy—and, that is to 
say, in Western thought—as following Ulysses: it is characterised by its failure to 
recognise the Other, always to return to the same. Totality and Infinity attempts to 
take philosophy elsewhere, to highlight the engagement with the Other that is prior to 
knowledge itself. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes labour and economic 
exchange as following Ulysses’s path: ‘Labor remains economic; it comes from the 
home and returns to it, a movement of Odyssey where the adventure pursued in the 
world is but the accident of a return’ (TI, p. 176-7). This motif has significant 
implications for how we think about education. Paul Standish, in ‘Data Return: The 
Sense of the Given in Educational Research’, has explored how this sense of a 
movement towards the Other is at odds with ways of thinking about educational 
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research in terms of targets, goals and productivity, and challenges us to think about 
work as a giving up of oneself to the Other: 
 
Work . . . is not the labour of exchange which remains within the circle of 
the natural. It does not arise from need or open onto a world that is for me. 
While data are situated within an economy of returns, of profit and loss, 
work aims at a possibility of the good that is not datable, that is 
impervious to targeting and audits. Work, an orientation that goes freely 
away from the Same, is tied to ethics itself. . . I expend myself, give 
myself up. My work goes beyond me in ways I cannot foresee, and with 
effects I cannot know. Without this all is limited (Standish, 2001, p. 513). 
 
This notion also has implications for how we think about the aims of education. 
The aims of autonomy and democracy within liberal education, classically 
advocated as a venturing forth for the sake of an ultimate return, confront in the 
thinking of Levinas a vision of the ethical that interrupts self-consciousness and 
rationality and proposes a venturing forth with no return to self. While the 
conversations, the writing, the performances that arise within formal education 
may be seen as belonging within the totality of economic exchange, the 
challenge Levinas poses is to view them as an offering up of the self to the 
Other prior to this, an offering made in vulnerability to the Other, from which 
there is no return. Yet this possibility of my vulnerability in the face of the 
infinite otherness and the infinite obligation I have towards the Other have been, 
on this account, suppressed by education, in order to confine what we can think 
within the realms of categorisation, exchange and possessive rationality. 
Although Levinas would not oppose the idea that formal education should 
promote rationality and autonomy (indeed, in Otherwise Than Being, we see 
that justice cannot be accomplished purely within the relation between self and 
neighbour and must move beyond this to the third person and society), his 
writing nevertheless challenges the priority that has in liberal education been 
accorded to autonomy, rationality and cognitive communication. 
 
Bildung as an educational ideal 
 
This potential provocation of Levinas’s writing for the ideal of the return to the same 
in the rationality of liberal education is similar to the challenge these ideas pose to the 
concept of Bildung in educational theory. The notion of Bildung has been used with 
the sense of the ‘upbringing’ of someone to a model image, ideal ambition or telos 
(Nordenbo, 2003, p. 27). There is not scope here to explore the various ways in which 
this ideal has been conceived within education, and the relation between self and 
society that is implied within the concept. However, the concept of Bildung can be 
seen to differ from Levinas’s presentation of the scene of teaching in its idea of 
edification, a remaking of the self. For Levinas, the movement towards the Other 
takes place in radical passivity: I am approached by the Other prior to any choice or 
thought, so that the priority of the self in the notion of Bildung is challenged by the 
priority of the Other, towards whom I move and through whose address I am called 
into being as one responsible. While Levinas might not have wanted in practical terms 
to challenge the idea of character development implicit in Bildung (something that 
might be seen as a useful aim within formal education), his writing on the scene of 
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teaching provides a way of thinking about teaching that demonstrates the troubling 
inadequacy of viewing the self as prior to the Other. 
 
Martin Buber’s Dialogical Philosophy of Education 
 
Martin Buber’s philosophy of the dialogical relation between self and other in the I-
Thou is both praised and criticised by Levinas.15 With his emphasis of the 
phenomenological irreducibility of the Thou in his I-Thou formulation, Buber stands 
close to Levinas. But it is interesting to consider the relationship between Buber’s 
philosophy of education and Levinas’s presentation of teaching. Buber summarises 
education and the role of the educator thus: 
 
The world, that is the whole environment, nature and society, ‘educates’ the 
human being: it draws out his powers, and makes him grasp and penetrate its 
objections. What we term education, conscious and willed, means a selection 
by man of the effective world: it means to give effective power to a selection 
of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the educator. The 
relation in education is lifted out of the purposelessly streaming education by 
all things, and is marked off as purpose. In this way, through the educator, 
the world for the first time becomes the true subject of its effect (Buber, 
[1947] 2002, p 106). 
 
We can see that although Buber’s account of teaching, like Levinas’s, involves an 
encounter with alterity, there is a significant difference in that Buber implies a 
drawing out from the learner of ‘his powers’, as in the traditional conception of 
education derived from the Latin ‘to draw out’. For Levinas, in contrast, teaching is 
the experience within the self of what could not have come from myself—of the idea 
of infinity, of the site of the opening of language. Furthermore, for Buber the teacher 
is in a relation of power, rather than magisterial vulnerability over the student. What 
for Buber might be described as teaching’s exposure of the world from a position of 
power might, for Levinas, be seen as its offering of the world from a position of 
vulnerability. Buber states: ‘The relation in education is one of pure dialogue.’ (TI, p. 
116). But for Levinas such dialogue is not reciprocal: it exposes the vulnerability of 
the Other and my obligation towards them. Dialogue tends to imply understanding, a 
meeting with the Other, but for Levinas, in the dialogical relation, the teacher remains 
beyond my knowing.  
 
The ‘Conversation of Mankind’ 
 
Another model of education that appears at one level similar to the notion of 
education as dialogue is Michael Oakeshott’s view of education as ‘the conversation 
of mankind’, ‘conversation’ being an idea Levinas uses to illustrate the relation with 
the Other. What is implied in this phrase if we examine it through the lens of 
Levinas’s teaching? If I consider my own education as part of ‘the conversation of 
mankind’, and I reflect on the way in which the Other has been and is addressed to me 
in various traditions and disciplines, and in various forms (through texts, 
conversations, images, music, gestures and art), I can appreciate that the not-I that is 
addressed to me is vulnerable to my response. In one way, we might suggest that, in a 
very real sense, traditions survive in the receptivity of each successive generation and 
are, therefore, vulnerable to those to whom they are passed on. But this is perhaps to 
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extend the implication of the vulnerability of the Other too far. The way that each 
individual receives aspects of different traditions in unique ways and, therefore, offers 
them to others in ways that are again different reveals this as simplistic. One way to 
interpret Levinas’s view of teaching, if seen as part of the ‘conversation of mankind’, 
would be to recognise the inherent risk that the learner will react with hostility 
towards what is brought to them from outside. Thus the position of magisterial height 
is precisely a position of vulnerability, and the ‘conversation of mankind’ contains 
ethical possibilities inherent within every word that is uttered.   
 
These ideas could be linked to Standish’s view that we might view the content of the 
curriculum as a form of the relation to the Other. This, he suggests is significant for 
our thinking about education, since formal education has often been responsible for 
violence towards the Other in models of learning that emphasise mastery of the 
subject under study: 
 
The curriculum—say, the triangle of teaching, learning, and content—is one 
way in which the relation to the Other can be realised. By the same token, 
but accenting the negative correlate of this, the curriculum is a site in which 
the underlying relation to the Other—this obligation and responsibility—is 
commonly, causally, systematically denied (Standish, 2007, p. 61). 
 
From this, Standish suggests that it is important to recognise the dominance of 
totalising forms of education and instead to move towards a kind of thinking that goes 
beyond the self, towards the stranger. He also suggests that this might practically 
challenge ‘the assumption that there must be a tidy matching of learning outcomes 
and learning outcomes, or . . . the exhaustive specification of criteria’ (p. 64). Rather 
‘teaching and learning should open ways beyond what is directly planned’ (ibid.). I 
would agree that this is a useful way of responding to the challenge of how to think 
about education after Levinas. The Other is not straightforwardly the other person for 
Levinas, as is sometimes suggested, and as Levinas himself sometimes seems to 
emphasise. Indeed, it is not really possible to say what the Other is, because to do so 
would be already to bring the Other into the categories of the same (see note 2). All 
we can do then is to speak of ways in which the Other addresses me.  
 
SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
 
Before attempting to draw this paper to a close, it is worth pausing to consider some 
of the challenges that might be raised against Levinas’s presentation of subjectivity.  
The first challenge is whether someone might take Levinas’s message to be a 
bit like Jesus’s, calling us to live in a new way, to turn from our former selfish ways. 
This would, however, be to misinterpret what Levinas is saying: he is not offering an 
ethical option among others. He is rather describing the transcendental conditions of 
subjectivity as ethical, conditions of which we are commonly in denial. It is perhaps 
difficult to read Totality and Infinity without being challenged to think about what 
infinite ethical responsibility might mean in practice. But Levinas does not, in this 
book at least, focus on the question of how the transcendental conditions of 
subjectivity as infinitely responsible relate to the practical experience of responsibility 
in which we find ourselves every day. This is not to say that this cannot be done. 
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Another objection might then be that Levinas does not relate his account to specific 
situations. Elsewhere in his writing, however, he elaborates the relation between the 
transcendental conditions for ethical subjectivity and practical action. He speaks of 
the possibility of ‘saintliness’, the conditions necessary for the possibility of a just, 
liberal society, in the light of which, he suggests, it is possible to recognise political 
regimes, for example, that lead to ethical violence: 
 
I maintain that this ideal of saintliness is presupposed in all our value 
judgments. There is no politics for accomplishing the moral, but there are 
certainly some politics which are further from it or closer to it. For 
example, I’ve mentioned Stalinism to you. I’ve told you that justice is 
always a justice which desires a better justice. This is the way that I will 
characterize the liberal state. The liberal state is a state which holds justice 
as the absolutely desirable end and hence as a perfection. Concretely, the 
liberal state has always admitted—alongside the written law—human 
rights as a parallel institution. It continues to preach that within its justice 
there are always improvements to be made in human rights. Human rights 
are the reminder that there is no justice yet. And consequently, I believe 
that it is absolutely obvious that the liberal state is more moral than the 
fascist state, and closer to the morally utopian state (Levinas, 1988, pp. 
177-178). 
 
Thus we can see that although Levinas does not spell out the link between the 
transcendental conditions of subjectivity and the practical demand of ethics itself, he 
nevertheless does envision an essential link between the transcendental condition of 
non-violence towards the Other and how we should live in practice. This is, as already 
stated, not presented as a formulaic ethical imperative, but as a possibility yet to be 
realised in practice.  
A further objection that might be raised is whether the notion of the Other as 
the teacher —especially the Other as Master and their address founding objectivity—
is just an apologia for a kind of authoritarianism. However, the authority of the Other 
does not come from a concrete relationship of power. The mastery of the Other stems 
from his very vulnerability: his vulnerability gives his interpellation an urgency and 
places his need before my own. This is the sense in which he has authority over me: it 
is not an authority to compel me or demand from me: it is the authority of 
vulnerability. Does the infant then have ‘mastery’ over its mother? The mother will 
put the infant’s needs before her own, where mastery might reside in the power of this 
vulnerability’s appeal. Obviously for Levinas, the Other who has mastery is not a 
specific person, as in this illustration, but their vulnerability is as potent as that of an 
infant. In terms of the Other’s address being the foundation of objectivity, the point 
that Levinas is making is perhaps simpler than it might appear. All my language 
comes to me from the Other (which is human), and it is by living in a world that is 
shared with others that objective truth is founded. The naming of things puts them in 
the space between the I and the Other and brings their possession into question, and 
this is not a relation of truth between the I and one other person, but between the I and 
all the others, such that the truth of what is thematised is established for me in the 
address of many others and in my response to them. 
Related to this notion of the mastery of the Other, someone might question 
whether Levinas is offering a prescription for self-effacement. This is also a 
misunderstanding. As already stated, Levinas is not prescribing a course of action. 
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But if reading Totality and Infinity raises the question of how to relate this 
transcendental condition of responsibility to our relations to others, even then the 
notion of infinite responsibility for the Other and welcoming the Other does not mean 
that we must necessarily agree with or acquiesce in everything others say or do to me. 
The idea of the ‘third party’ and of community in Levinas, which is developed at 
greater length in Otherwise Than Being, suggests how the condition of responsibility 
to the Other is worked out in practice against the needs of many others. Thus the 
interpellation of the Other is not a private imperative: ‘Everything that takes place 
here “between us” concerns everyone, the face that looks at it places itself in the full 
light of the public order. Even if I draw back from it to seek with the interlocutor the 
complicity of a private relation and a clandestinity’ (TI, p. 212). My responsibility 
towards the Other is enacted within human community and fraternity, and I have a 
responsibility for myself and for the Other. Although my responsibility is infinite, 
what that responsibility means then has to be worked out within the bonds of human 
kinship and against the background of responsibility for myself: 
 
Society must be a fraternal community to be commensurate with the 
straightforwardness, the primary proximity, in which the face presents itself 
to my welcome. Monotheism signifies this human kinship, this idea of a 
human race that refers back to the approach of the Other in the face, in a 
dimension of height, in responsibility for oneself and for the Other (TI, p. 
214).  
 
Thus responsibility for the Other does involve self-sacrifice, but this is not the 
same as self-debasement. 
Having paused to consider these possible objections, let us attempt to 
draw this paper to a close.  
 
THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF ETHICAL SUBJECTIVITY  
 
In contrast to the conceptualisations of the subject as a social construction, or more 
specifically as an effect of various power relations, in theorists such as Michel 
Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Louis Althusser, what does it mean to think in terms of 
ethical subjectivity and being taught after Levinas? In such constructions, there is 
also, as in Levinas, the notion of interpellation as fundamental in our understanding of 
subjectivity, but here it is ideologies and social structures that interpellate, calling and 
locating individuals as subjects within systems and giving them identities necessary to 
the organisation and functioning of the existing social order, the order of things. 
Levinas’s provocation is unique in drawing attention to the ethical conditions at the 
heart of the interpellation to subjectivity as infinite responsibility. In coming to see 
my subjectivity as a continuing responding to the Other’s prior address, I, Levinas’s 
reader, am challenged to work out for myself what an ever-extending responsibility 
means—and this not in some theoretical elaboration but in the practical conditions of 
life. Perhaps this is similar to Zygmunt Bauman’s description of moral responsibility:  
 
Moral responsibility is the most personal and inalienable of human 
possessions, and the most precious of human rights. It cannot be taken away, 
shared, ceded, pawned, or deposited for safe-keeping. Moral responsibility is 
unconditional and infinite, and it manifests itself in the constant anguish of 
not manifesting itself enough (Bauman, 1993, p. 250). 
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As my subjectivity is found in this moral responsibility, it is also shown as always 
future, deferred, on-the-way-to-being: this extending responsibility towards the 
infinite and transcendent Other deepens. Perhaps I am then always on the way to 
subjectivity, called to infinite responsibility as a radical (im)possibility. I use the 
parenthetic ‘(im)’ here to show that to be a subject in the sense that Levinas suggests 
is always already implicated as a possibility in the very conditions of language, 
knowledge and all relationships, as coming to the self from outside, while at the same 
time, the sense that the responsibility for the Other through which I am elected to 
subjectivity is, in its very infinity, an impossibility. 
As an educational aim, there is a sense in which all teaching is already predicated 
on my being an ethical subject, already obligated to the Other. There is another sense 
in which deepening and extending that sense of what subjectivity means could be seen 
as a challenge to how we tend to conceive of education. In Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas is not offering me or impelling me towards one way of being ethical, but 
rather offering me, the reader, a word of invitation to recognise the structure of my 
subjectivity as responsibility. This is a prophetic discourse that appeals to me to join it 
and judge it. Reading Totality and Infinity draws me to (but could not force me to) 
question whether I can testify to the possibility of goodness that Levinas testifies to. 
This prophetic form of discourse could be seen as a kind of (a)theology of education. 
God is central to Levinas’s thinking, but here God means what is otherwise than 
being, what cannot be comprehended, what is transcendent. This is not the God of 
theism, but the transcendence of alterity and the infinity of my responsibility that 
eludes intelligibility and vision. This is similar to Franz Rosenzweig’s view of 
redemption in The Star of Redemption, in which the messianic age happens now, the 
not-yet is in the present moment through the proximity of the neighbour and the act of 
neighbourly love. Kenneth Reinhard elaborates on what this messianic temporality 
means for Rosenzweig: 
 
For Rosenzweig, love of the neighbor is not merely the first step on the path 
to redemption, the good deed that might help make the world a better place 
in some hypothetical future, but its realization now, the immanent production 
of its transcendental conditions. The nearness of the neighbor materializes 
the imminence of redemption, releasing the here and the now from the fetters 
of teleology in the infinitesimal calculus of proximity (Reinhard, 2005, p. 
21). 
 
Although Levinas points out that love is not always for the Other, Rosenzweig’s 
vision of loving the neighbour as the site of eschatology, and by implication 
transcendence, is perhaps an example of the sort of rupture in which God is 
manifested in the way that Levinas suggests. Here God is not a being as in classical 
theism, nor the ground of Being as in existentialist theology, but precisely beyond 
being, the transcendence of my infinite responsibility for the Other, which is the site 
of my subjectivity. This notion of God bursts open the ‘omnipotence of the logos, of 
the logos of system and simultaneity’ and instead manifests ‘transcendence as 
signification, and signification as the signification of an order given to subjectivity 
before any statement: a pure one-for-the-other’ (Levinas, [1986] 1998, p. 78). Such 
notions of transcendence, infinity and God do not, therefore, need to be read as 
belonging to a conventionally religious framework, but rather are suggestive of the 
ethical that lies beyond intelligibility and is prior to reason. In this way such concepts 
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beautifully serve to rupture notions of education that prioritise communicative 
cognition as foundational, revealing the interruption of the logos by ethics. 
In reading Levinas I come to understand that who I am is always already the 
result of a teaching, receiving from the Other what was outside myself. But further 
exploration (not offered by Levinas) is needed of what these transcendental conditions 
mean in relation to how we understand society, community, politics and justice, and 
the relation of education to these. What do such notions of the Other who is always 
beyond concrete particularities mean in relation to the very concrete particularities of 
existence? Is this notion of the transcendent Other beyond identity to whom I am 
bound in a relation of obligation the best way to conceive of alterity in terms of 
concrete action? Reinhard quotes Adorno’s questioning of Kierkegaard on this point: 
‘the overstraining of the transcendence of love threatens, at any given moment, to 
become transformed into the darkest hatred of man’ (Reinhard, 2005, p. 23). In order 
to explore further the question of the practical ethical and educational implications of 
this notion of alterity, it would be worth exploring how Levinas’s presentation of 
alterity has been taken up by other theorists such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Judith 
Butler, both of whose writings are more focused on practical and political concerns 
within contemporary society. It would also be worth considering the development of 
the idea of the third party by Levinas in Otherwise Than Being. Furthermore, the 
development in Levinas’s thought of the relation with the Other as the trauma of 
persecution, and the thematisation of language in the contrast between the saying and 
the said (le dire and le dit)in this work demand further attention in terms of the 
challenge the ethical sublime presents for educational ideals. It is clear, however, that 
philosophical questions surrounding what ethical subjectivity and alterity mean within 
education need greater analysis in the light of the needs of those many concrete others 
who address us and demand our response. Levinas’s presentation of a justice that 
‘summons me to go beyond the straight line of justice’ must challenge educationalists 
to think anew what it might mean to enact a justice that extends ‘behind the straight 
line of the law’ to ‘the land of goodness . . . infinite and unexplored’ (Levinas, [1969] 
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1 The other being Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence (Levinas [1981] 2004) 
2 The capitalised of ‘Other’ is typically used to translate the French l’autrui as opposed to l’autre, and 
it indicates an absolute relation to the other person, independent of particular characteristics, of factors 
that might differentiate this person from that person. The usage is not entirely consistent. 
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3 ‘Desire’ for Levinas means desire for the absolutely other, a metaphysical desire which can never be 
satisfied, as opposed to the kinds of desires we can satisfy, and thus denotes a movement outwards, 
towards the absolutely Other, and the capitalisation of this term indicates this particular sense. This 
notion of metaphysical desire could be distinguished from ‘desire’ that aims to bring the Other into the 
field of the same, or aims at the synthesis of self and Other. Desire for Levinas must maintain the 
alterity of the Other as beyond possession. He outlines this sense of Desire as follows: ‘The idea of the 
Infinite is Desire. It paradoxically consists in thinking more than what is thought and maintaining what 
is though in this very excess relative to thought—in entering into a relationship with the ungraspable 
while guaranteeing its status of being ungraspable.’ (Levinas 1996, p. 55) 
4 Nigel Tubbs, in ‘From the ‘Philosophy of the Teacher’ to the Suppressed Concept of the Other in 
Modernity,’ a paper delivered at the PESGB conference in March 2007, challenged Levinas on this 
idea, arguing that the Other is a fundamental concept in the philosophy of modernity. He suggests that 
to ‘know thyself’ is to know the Other. While his thesis is provocative and there is much that is useful 
in the concept of oneself as an Other, his notion that the Other is vulnerable for Levinas whereas I am 
not goes against Levinas’s emphasis in Otherwise than Being that I also am vulnerable, and that it is 
only as one who is vulnerable that I can myself give. 
5 It would be interesting to explore further the ways in which Plato’s good beyond being, as 
acknowledged by Levinas, allows for alterity, or whether the Other is still subsumed in the self in our 
relation to the Good. Levinas suggests that the notion of desire presented in Diotima’s speech in the 
Symposium is a form of incest, while at the same time pointing out that Plato presents discourse as 
discourse with God in the Phaedrus and thus suggesting that ‘metaphysics is the essence of language 
with god; it leads above being.’ (TI, p. 297). The relationship between self, Other and teaching in Plato 
is complex and deserves further attention. 
6 Sharon Todd also uses the phrase ‘bringing me more than I contain’ in Learning from the Other: 
Levinas, Psychoanalysis and Ethical Possibilities in Education (2003), as the title of a chapter in which 
she explores the relation between ethics and the curriculum. 
7 The ‘epiphany of the face’, which functions in Levinas as a kind of metonym for the relation to the 
Other, refers to the way that this relation always goes beyond what is to be understood 
phenomenologically. To see a face as a human face is not to arrive at a conception of the interiority of 
the human being on the evidence of the appearance of the nose, mouth, eyes. . . ; the relation to 
interiority is always prior. The face is what you see when you do not see the colour of a person’s eyes.  
8 Heidegger, for example, in ‘Language’ objects, in similar vein, to the way that language is commonly 
viewed primarily as a means of communication: ‘The current view declares that speech is the activation 
of the organs for sounding and hearing. Speech is the audible expression and communication of human 
feelings’ (Heidegger, [1971] 2001, p. 190). 
9 Although this notion of non-reciprocity in Levinas perhaps does leave open the possibility that 
Derrida suggests in Writing and Difference, that there is a metaphysical symmetry of asymmetries in 
the relation between self and Other: ‘That I am also essentially the other’s other, and that I know I am, 
is the evidence of a strange symmetry whose trace appears nowhere in Levinas’s descriptions. Without 
this evidence, I could not desire [or] respect the other in ethical dissymmetry.’ (Derrida [1978] 2003, p. 
160) 
10 For example: ‘The way the object is posited as a theme offered envelops the instance of signifying—
not the referring of the thinker who fixes it to what is signified (and is part of the same system), but the 
manifesting of the signifier, the issuer of the sign, an absolute alterity which nonetheless speaks to him 
and thereby thematizes, that is, proposes a world’ (TI, p. 96, emphasis added). 
11 Unless the Other speaks of himself, in which case, as Levinas writes, ‘then he would announce 
himself as signified and consequently as a sign in his turn.’ (Ibid.) 
12 In the Kantian sense, where spontaneity, which refers to what comes from within me, contrasts with 
experience, which comes from outside. 
13 Freud in Civilisation and Its Discontents provides an example of an attitude that rejects the notion of 
responsibility towards that which is Other: ‘If I love another person, he must in some way deserve it… 
He deserves it if, in certain important respects, he so much resembles me that in him I can love myself. 
He deserves it if he is so much more perfect than myself that I can love in him an ideal image of 
myself… But if he is a stranger to me and cannot attract by any merit of his own or by any importance 
he has acquired in my emotional life, it becomes hard for me to love him. Indeed, it would be wrong of 
me to do so, for my love is prized by my family and friends as a sign of my preference for them; to put 
a stranger on a par with them would be to do them an injustice. Yet if I am to love him, with this 
universal love—just because he is a creature of this earth, like an insect, an earthworm or a grass-
snake, and certainly not as much as the judgement of my reason entitles me to reserve for myself. What 
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is the point of such a portentous precept if its fulfilment cannot commend itself as reasonable?’ (Freud 
2002, pp. 46-7) 
14 This appears in his work as early as 1948 with the publication of En découvrant l’existence avec 
Husserl et Heidegger. 
15 There is not scope here to explore fully the ‘dialogue’ between Buber and Levinas. The most helpful 
treatment of this is Robert Bernasconi’s ‘Failure of Communication as a Surplus: Dialogue and Lack of 
Dialogue between Buber and Levinas’ (Bernasconi, [1988] 1998). 
